We explore the impact of competition on innovation in a supply chain consisting of upstream manufacturers investing in innovation and a downstream retailer selling to consumers. We find that the competition between manufacturers induces more innovation. Moreover, the competition affects the inferior manufacturers innovation investment more than the superior manufacturers. In addition, studying the effect of complementary innovative-component manufacturers, we demonstrate that under the presence of a complementary component manufacturer, competition fosters even more innovation by all manufacturers.
Introduction
Innovation is one of the key forces that can continuous renew consumer demand as well as foster the success of a firm, especially in high-tech industries. For example, in the personal computer industry, innovation in the microprocessors primarily supplied by two competing firms, Intel and AMD, is essential for the business of a personal computer seller, such as HP.
Moreover, in this industry strong complementarity exists between hardware and software, e.g., Intel/AMD and Microsoft. In this example, HP, as a downstream firm in a supply chain, assembles computers using chips and software from upstream suppliers, and sells them to end consumers. One of the key questions for HP is then: Does the presence of AMD push
Intel to innovate more? In other words, what is the impact of upstream competition on innovations when competing firms sell through an intermediary downstream retailer? The structure of the supply chains as well as the competitive environment play critical roles in answering this question. Please note that in the remaining of the paper, we call the upstream firms "manufacturers" and the downstream firm a "retailer", but the analysis also applies to set-ups with upstream manufacturers and a downstream assembler, as well as to those with upstream suppliers and a downstream manufacturer.
We show that upstream competition slightly increases the innovation level of the superior (i.e., more cost-efficient) component manufacturer, whereas it substantially increases the inferior component manufacturer's incentive to innovate. Consequently, upstream competition between Intel and AMD increases the overall aggregate investment in innovation. We also explore the effect of the existence of a complementary component manufacturer, such as Microsoft in the computer industry. We demonstrate that in the presence of a complementary component manufacturer, upstream competition further increases incentives to innovate for both upstream firms (in our example, Intel and AMD).
This question is of importance to managers in green-product industries as well, since developing new environmentally-friendly products requires large innovation investments from different parties in the supply chain. For example, First Solar, the largest thin-film module manufacturer in the world, is currently facing the challenge of how to better motivate its glass manufacturer to invest more in innovation in order to improve the efficiency of its solar panels. Our results suggest that if complementarity is important for thin-film solar modules components, First Solar would be able to induce its glass supplier to invest more in innovation by increasing upstream competition via sourcing from multiple glass suppliers.
Our paper belongs to the operations management literature on innovations and new product development. Krishnan and Ulrich (2001) This research is also related to the economics literature exploring the relationship between competition and innovation. The theoretical research in this stream can be traced back to Schumpeter (1942) , who suggested that competition hurts innovation. On the empirical side, Cohen and Levin (1989) reviewed the empirical literature in regard to the impact of market structure on innovation, and found that the empirical evidence on testing this impact is inconclusive. In a more recent study, Aghion et al. (2005) develop a theoretical model which posits an inverted-U relationship between competition and innovation. Their empirical investigation, using panel data of U.K. patents, confirms their hypothesis. Analysing the impact of competition on process innovation and entry under both Bertrand and Cournot models, Vives (2008) concludes that a higher industry concentration induces more process innovation in general. Our model differs from the papers in this stream of literature in that it looks at the impact of competition on product innovation when the manufacturers sell their products through an intermediary retailer. We also demonstrate that the existence of complementarity changes the dynamics in a supply chain; consequently, the impact of competition on innovation in such a supply chain structure may vary, depending on the presence of complementarity.
Upstream Competition without Complementarity
As our baseline supply chain structure, we first consider a supply chain with one downstream retailer, plus two upstream manufacturers that invest in innovation. In the monopoly case, those two manufacturers are integrated; consequently, the monopolist manufacturer controls both of them, as illustrated in panel (a) of figure 1. In the competition case, those two manufacturers produce substitutes and compete against each other, as illustrated in panel (b) of figure 1.
To capture the asymmetry in practice and in particular, for the case of Intel and AMD, we allow the two manufacturers to be different in their innovation capabilities. Without loss of generality, we denote manufacturer 1 as the more efficient one and manufacturer 2 as the
Manufacturer(s) and the retailer bargain.
Manufacturer(s) invest in innovation.
The retailer sets retail prices and the revenue is realized. Figure 2 : The timeline less efficient one; specifically, in order to achieve quality levels Q 1 and Q 2 , the innovation investment costs for manufacturers 1 and 2 are C 1 Q 2 1 /2 and C 2 Q 2 2 /2, respectively, where
For example, in the PC industry discussed previously, Intel may be considered as manufacturer 1, and AMD as manufacturer 2. In addition to their innovation investment costs, the manufacturers also incur a unit production cost kQ 2 /2, which implies that a higher quality product is more costly to produce.
On the demand side, consumers are vertically differentiated in their taste for quality Q Sutton 1983, 1987) ; each consumer has a taste parameter θ, which is uniformly distributed on a unit interval [0, 1] . If a consumer with taste θ buys a product with quality
. Consumers need at most one product, and make their purchase decisions to maximize their utility.
The timeline of our model is shown in figure 2 . There are three stages. At the initial stage s = 1, the manufacturers determine their investments in innovation (Q 1 and Q 2 , respectively) and incur the innovation costs. At the second stage s = 2, the retailer and manufacturer(s) bargain on how to split the gross profit, not including the innovation investment cost, which is sunk at this stage. Finally, at the last stage s = 3, the retailer sells products in the consumer market, and then all the parties split the revenue based on the bargaining result.
For the bargaining process at s = 2, we utilize a sequential bilateral bargaining model contracts. Lastly, all players' profits must sum up to the total profit, which is Σ
where π is the total supply chain profit.
Note that the relative bargaining strength in the model of de Fontenay and Gans (2007) is endogenously captured through firms' reservation profits, which depend on the structure of the supply chain and the competition. For example, consider the scenario with upstream competition. If the bilateral bargaining between an upstream firm and one of the downstream firms breaks down, the downstream firm can still bargain with the other upstream firm, whereas the upstream firm has no chance to generate any profit after the breakdown.
Consequently, the downstream firm's bargaining strength exceeds that of a upstream firm.
However, given that the outcomes of other negotiations are held fixed, bilateral bargaining occurs in the manner specified by Binmore et al. (1986) , and its outcome becomes an immediate agreement, which is the Nash bargaining solution. The equilibrium outcome
arising from the bargaining model of de Fontenay and Gans (2007) is a noncooperative equilibrium that is a generalized Shapley division of a noncooperative surplus for a multi-agent bargaining environment with externalities. In the absence of externalities, the allocation under an equilibrium outcome corresponds to the Myerson value; and under a complete network without externalities, the allocation reduces to the Shapley value.
First, we study the upstream monopoly case in which the two manufacturers are integrat-ed into one firm. In this scenario, the reservation values for both the integrated manufacturer and the retailer are zero, and they split the gross profit (excluding the innovation cost) equally. Note that Q 2 ≤ Q 1 ≤ 2/k, because it is not optimal for the manufacturer to choose Q 1 < Q 2 when it can reap the same gross profit with less innovation investment by setting Q 1 = Q 2 and Q 2 = Q 1 . And the highest price that the consumer is willing to pay for a product of quality Q is Q, which is no less than the marginal production cost kQ 2 /2 if and
In order to obtain the equilibrium outcome, we solve backwards. In stage 3, given fixed innovation levels Q 2 ≤ Q 1 ≤ 2/k, the retailer sets retail prices to maximize its own profit, which is equivalent to maximizing the total supply chain gross profit:
Solving this maximization problem, we obtain the optimal retail prices, as follows:
and the corresponding total supply chain revenue as
Therefore, in the innovation investment stage, the manufacturer's innovation decision is
Optimizing (4) with respect to Q 1 and Q 2 under small k, we obtain the equilibrium innovation levels as stated in the following lemma:
Lemma 1 Without complementarity, the equilibrium innovation levels in the upstream monopoly case under small k are:
Proof. Based on the bargaining outcome, the manufacturer's profit is given in (4). For her optimal decision on investments Q 1 and Q 2 , we take the derivatives of (4) with respect to those variables, as follows:
One can now show that the second order conditions for this joint optimization are satisfied under small k. Consequently, the first order conditions are sufficient.
Since the maximum price that a consumer is willing to pay for a product of quality Q is Q, the maximum revenue that a manufacturer can collect from a product of quality Q is Q. Therefore, an upper bound for manufacturer i's profit if its product quality is
, its profit will be negative. However, it can always choose Q i = 0 and thereby get zero profit. So an upper bound of manufacturer i's equilibrium innovation level Q i is 2/C i , and a natural lower bound for Q i is zero.
Since Q 1 and Q 2 are bounded,
where A is a constant. So
, that is,
Solving ∂ ∂Q 2 π M (Q 1 , Q 2 ) = 0 for Q 2 , we then obtain
Because Q * (11), we obtain (6). Substituting (10) and (6) 
we obtain
. Then manufacturer 1's first order condition can be rewritten as
. Taking the Taylor expansion at k = 0, we obtain the expression given in (5).
The equilibrium results suggest that without upstream competition, and under small k (i.e., under small unit-production-cost difference), the manufacturer focuses her investment primarily on the high-quality product. However, as the unit-production-cost coefficient increases (i.e., as k increases), the investment in the inferior product increases, while the investment in the superior product decreases; this is because as k increases, the cost benefit of the inferior product increases, which gives the firm a larger incentive to invest in it. Moreover, the cost disadvantage of higher quality products increases; therefore, the investment in the superior product decreases. This observation has a managerial implication on firms' product line decisions: as the unit-production-cost difference between high quality and low quality products increases, an upstream innovating firm should reduce the difference in product quality. Moreover, we observe that the cannibalization effect of the inferior product on the superior product is of a second order effect due to the unit-production-cost difference.
Second, we analyze the upstream competition case in which the two substitute manufacturers compete against each other. We start by analyzing the reservation values of all firms.
In the remaining of the paper, we designate the upstream manufacturer(s) as female and the downstream retailer as male. The reservation value for each manufacturer is zero because she cannot sell any product without contracting with the retailer. So
However, the retailer has a positive reservation value, which equals the profit he can obtain by selling only the remaining manufacturer's product; in this case, the retailer reaps half of the total gross profit, and its pricing problem of selling one product with quality Q is
Optimizing (12) with respect to p, we obtain the optimal price
and the corresponding retailer's reservation value of selling a product with quality Q is
Now, consider the full bargaining game with two manufacturers and one retailer. Let the qualities of the products be Q 1 and Q 2 , with Q 2 ≤ Q 1 ≤ 2/k. Solving the retailer's pricing problem, we have the optimal prices as given in (2), and the corresponding maximized total supply chain gross profit as in (3). The bargaining model requires:
Solving these equations simultaneously, we obtain the profits (excluding the investment costs) of all firms as functions of the quality levels; those profits are
and Π R (Q 1 , Q 2 ) for the two competing manufactures and the retailer, respectively. In the innovation investment period, manufacturer i chooses the innovation level Q i to maximize her profit given the other manufacturer's innovation Q j , as follows:
Optimizing (16) with respect to Q i , we obtain the best response functions Q * i (Q j ), for i = 1, 2.
We can then find the equilibrium innovation investment levels under small k, as stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Without complementarity, the equilibrium innovation levels in the upstream com-
petition case under small k are:
The first order conditions of manufacturer 1 and manufacturer 2 are, respectively, as follows:
And the second order conditions are
Since the second order conditions are satisfied under small k, the first order conditions are both necessary and sufficient under small k.
. Therefore, the unique solution to (19) is Q *
Manufacturer 1's first order condition can then be rewritten as 12
Solving this first order condition, we obtain:
From this expression, we can then obtain (17). Following similar steps, we obtain (18) for manufacturer 2.
We observe that with competition, both manufacturers invest substantially in innovation even under small k. Moreover, both investments are decreasing in k in a first order manner; that is, a cost increase reduces incentives for both manufacturers to invest in innovation.
From a comparison of (5) and (17), it follows that upstream competition induces more innovation in the higher quality product. In addition, by comparing (6) with (18), we find that upstream competition also induces more innovation in the lower quality product.
Finally, by comparing the sum of the innovation investment levels, we discover that Q 1 + Q 2 is larger under upstream competition than under upstream monopoly. The results are summarized in the following proposition: Under upstream monopoly, when k is small (i.e., when the difference in unit-production costs between two innovative components associated with qualities Q 1 and Q 2 is small), the additional revenue generated by introducing an inferior product also becomes small.
The monopoly manufacturer consequently does not want to invest much in innovation on the inferior product. Instead, she mostly invests in innovating the superior product to make it more attractive to consumers. However, under upstream duopoly, the existence of manufacturer 2 (the less efficient manufacturer) increases the retailer's bargaining position when he negotiates with manufacturer 1 (the more efficient manufacturer). The retailer therefore is willing to pay a larger share of revenue to keep his relationship with manufacturer 2, which in turn provides manufacturer 2 an incentive to innovate more so that the quality of her product becomes higher than that under upstream monopoly. For the more efficient manufacturer (i.e., manufacturer 1), even though her total revenue is substantially smaller, the fact that the retailer has a stronger bargaining position results in her losing a constant part of her revenue at the same time that her marginal benefit slightly increases. As a result, she innovates a little more, but the difference is relatively small. Lastly, upstream competition therefore increases the overall investment in innovation.
This result provides an answer to our question about the innovation in the personal computer industry. The implication of this proposition is that if Intel and AMD would merge into a monopoly, the monopoly (i.e., the integrated firm) would have a little less incentive to innovate Intel's product and much less incentive to innovate AMD's product. Overall, the merged integrated firm would invest less in innovation.
Moreover, this finding is also relevant to the challenge First Solar has faced, associated with its sourcing: how to motivate more upstream innovation? Is it better for First Solar to source from multiple glass suppliers, which induces competition among upstream suppliers, or to source from a single supplier? Our finding demonstrates that dual sourcing, or upstream competition, in a supply chain leads to more upstream investments in innovation. This complements the dual sourcing literature in operations management by suggesting another benefit of dual sourcing, namely, the fact that upstream firms have stronger incentives to invest in innovation under dual sourcing than under single sourcing.
Upstream Competition with Complementarity
In the personal computer industry, there exists strong complementarity between hardware and software. As a result, innovation is critical among chip manufacturers as well as among software vendors such as Microsoft. The presence of Microsoft therefore impacts Intel's and AMD's incentives to innovate. We now extend our model to include a complementary component manufacturer like Microsoft. The corresponding supply chain structure is illustrated in figure 3 . In addition to two substitute component manufacturers, like AMD and Intel, we also have a complementary component manufacturer (denoted as manufacturer 3). From those best response functions, we can then derive the equilibrium innovation levels, as shown in the following lemma. 
Proof. The first order conditions of optimization problems (23) and (24) 
It is straightforward to verify that the second order conditions of (23) and (24) are all satisfied. So the first order conditions are sufficient for equilibrium outcomes. Solving the above first order conditions for e 1 , e 2 , and e 3 , we obtain the equilibrium innovation effort levels given in (25).
The quality of the superior product is Q 1 = e Second, in the upstream competition case, the negotiation model requires that the following conditions hold: we obtain the equilibrium innovation effort levels given in (31).
By comparing (25) with (31), we discover that e 1 , e 2 , and e 3 are larger under competition than those under monopoly, from which Proposition 2 follows. Under upstream competition, the bargaining positions of the competing manufacturers are weakened, whereas the retailer and the complementary component manufacturer enjoy larger shares of the total revenue, which provides the complementary component manufacturer more incentive to innovate. Given that the complementary component manufacturer innovates more, the marginal benefit of innovation increases for the substitute manufacturers (i.e., manufacturers 1 and 2), due to complementarity. They consequently invest more in innovation. As a result, in equilibrium, all firms invest more in innovation under competition than under monopoly. This finding demonstrates that the presence of complementarity strengthens the result presented in Proposition 1.
Proposition 2 presents the impact of upstream competition on innovation under the presence of a complementary component manufacturer, when the unit production costs are negligible. In figure 4 , we show that the result in this proposition is robust even under positive unit production costs (k > 0); the equilibrium innovation investment levels, e * 1 , e * 2 , and e * 3 , are larger under upstream competition than those under upstream monopoly. Furthermore, note that the investment levels in innovation decrease in k for both manufacturer 1 and the complementary component manufacturer, and increase in k for manufacturer 2. The magnitude of the slopes under upstream competition is small. The directions are, however, the same as those under upstream monopoly. As the unit-production-cost parameter k increases, the value of the inferior component produced by manufacturer 2 increases, because 
Concluding Remarks
We have studied the impact of competition on innovation in a supply chain when upstream manufacturers sell through an intermediary retailer. We showed that it increases investment in innovation on the part of both a superior supplier and an inferior one. Moreover, the impact is larger for the inferior supplier than the superior one. We also show that the presence of a complementary component manufacturer strengthens the result.
Innovation is one of the core competencies for firms in industries such as high-tech, green technology, and renewable energy. Our research will therefore help scholars and practitioners better understand how competition affects innovation in the perspective of a supply chain, as well as how complementarity affects innovation investments. This research can also help sourcing and procurement managers to find solutions to the question of how to motivate their suppliers to invest more in innovation.
